In case of non-payments any of participants of multilateral clearing of positions the system risk of an illiquidity can become the especially considerable. After recalculation of multilateral balances each (remained) participant can be owes a large sum or can receive the smaller sum. Even those participants have systems of payments or clearing which did not conduct calculations with the defaulter, needs for liquidity can increase in case participants with whom they conducted calculations, lack for liquidity because of non-payment by calculations.
The settlement period is shorter, the risk of failure to pay by calculations and the related system risk is less. As the additional mechanism control devices on the scale of real time which help to reveal potential problems at an early stage are applied and facilitate management of liquid means, especially when the centralized control of balance of all participants is possible.
Process of clearing of obligations of the participating parties of clearing system carries the name of a clearing session. He is led by clearing chamber several times during the day to in advance determined time and serves for calculation of intermediate or total balance of each member of chamber.
Integrated clearing there is a difference of these two sizes. Means, and too small log of clearing is bad, and too big log of clearing is bad. Therefore, there is an optimum log and it needs to be defined.
Thus, multilateral nature of activity of clearing chamber does not give a guarantee of decrease in risk of an illiquidity in comparison with bilateral clearing by an innovation. In practice risk of an illiquidity including system, in this case it can appear higher.
Clearing log – an interval of time during which the package of payment documents and after which the decision on clearing payment is passed is formed. The factor of a log is shown doubly and in opposite tendencies:
Multilateral clearing by an innovation and replacement possesses potential possibility of bigger decrease in risk of an illiquidity in comparison with any other form of clearing. At such system of clearing for this date of transfer of means the pure sums of debt in comparison with bilateral clearing decrease or remain invariable for some participants. It reduces risk of an illiquidity for certain participants, for participants of clearing in general and, perhaps, for other financial markets.
The mechanism of minimization of risks provides also obligatory bail by participants of system of clearing into the account of any third party or the member of clearing chamber reliable financially. Thus it is allowed only calculations for the sum which is not exceeding the amount of the posted bail.